DISCRIMINATION AND THE NLRB: THE SCOPE OF BOARD
POWER UNDER SECTIONS 8(a)(3) AND 8(b)(2)

The scope of sections 8(a)(3)1 and 8(b)(2)2 of the National Labor
Relations Act has been the subject of renewed attention in recent years.
With section 8(b)(1)(A)3 and 8(b)(3), 4 these sections have been seen as
a means of expanding the power of the National Labor Relations Board
to deal with racial discrimination and other arbitrary or invidious discrimination against employees. 5 The NLRB sought to extend its unfair
labor practice machinery to cover arbitrary non-racial treatment in
Miranda Fuel Co.,6 and racial discrimination in Independent Metal
Workers, Local 1 & 2. 7 The implications of such an expansion of Board
1 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1958).
2

61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1958).

3 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A): "It shall be an unfair labor practice for
a labor organization or its agents--(l) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in section [7]: Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair
the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein; . . ."
4 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1958): "It shall be an unfair labor practice
for a labor union or its agents-(3) to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer,
provided it is the representative of his employees .... "
5 See generally Sovern, Racial Discrimination and the National Labor Relations Act:
The Brave New World of Miranda, NEw YORK UNIVERSITY SIXTEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 3 (1963); Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 Vn.L. L. Rlv. 151
(1957); Sovern, The NationalLabor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination,62 COLUM.
L. REv. 563 (1962); Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 711 -(1964); Note, 42 TEXAs L. REv.
917 (1964).
6 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). But cf.
Stout v. Construction & General Laborers Dist. Council, 226 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ill.
1963).
7 147 N.L.R.B. No. 166 (1964). The union maintained two locals at the Hughes Tool
Company in Houston, Texas, one representing white employees of the company and
the other representing Negro employees. The locals were jointly certified in 1959 as
bargaining representatives of the company's employees. After the two locals were
unable to agree in 1961 on a proposal for eliminating racial segregation, the Negro
local refused to sign a new contract. The company and white local signed the contract
and put it into effect. When the white local and the company later agreed to increase
the number of apprenticeships, which under the new contract were available only to
white employees, a Negro employee bid for one of the apprenticeships. After his bid
was rejected, he asked the white local to represent him in processing a grievance
protesting the matter but received no reply from the president of the local. The
employee filed an unfair labor practice charge alleging that the local's refusal to
process his grievance was unlawful restraint and coercion under section 8(b)(1)(A). A
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power are far reaching. The NLRB, already heavily burdened, may be
inundated with allegations of various types of discrimination by any
employee who feels mistreated by his employer or union. If such alleged
injustices are arguably unfair labor practices, the Board's primary jurisdiction may preempt other tribunals. The jurisdiction of other administrative agencies, such as state fair employment practices commissions, would thus be doubtful. 8 Also, a policy conflict with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Law, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 9 is possible. Finally, if the Board's power is extended to adjudicate
charges of racial discrimination, the Board must consider practices and
policy objectives which are beyond its labor relations expertise and which
have been committed, in large part, to other tribunals.
Although the matter bristles with doubt, the courts may approve such
expansion of Board power in construing sections 8(b)(1)(A), 8(b)(2) and
8(a)(3), or 8(b)(3). The latter section seems to deal with formal bargaining and grievance prosecution, but it has been said to be violated by
a union which practices any invidious discrimination toward its members. 10 Greater support has been generated for reliance by the Board
on section 8(b)(1)(A), in dealing with such discrimination." The subcomplaint was issued. The Negro local later asked rescission of the joint certification,
contending that the segregated locals and the practices of the white local in discriminating against Negroes invalidated the certification.
All five members of the Board agreed that the union's certification should be
rescinded. All five also agreed that the refusal to process the grievance was illegal
coercion of an employee and violated 8(b)(1)(A). A three member majority went further
and held that the refusal to process the grievance was a refusal to bargain collectively
with the company, hence a violation of section 8(b)(3), and caused the company to
discriminate against the employee, a violation of section 8(b)(2).
Two members dissented from the 8(b)(2) and (3) holdings. They contended that there
was a procedural bar to considering the issue since the formal complaint had charged
only an 8(b)(1)(A) violation. Secondly, they disagreed with the holding that a union
violates 8(b)(2) when it causes discrimination based on race. They contended that
section 8(b)(2) proscribes only discrimination related to "union membership, loyalty,
the acknowledgement of union authority, or the performance of union obligations."
See also Local 1367, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 148 N.L.R.B. No. 44 (1964). In this
case the union maintained and enforced a 75-25% work distribution between the Negro
and white locals involved in collective bargaining agreements with employer associations, and enforced a "no doubling" arrangement forbidding white and Negro gangs
being assigned to work together in ship hatches. The Board affirmed the examiner's
findings of an 8(b)(1)(A) violation. The Board also affirmed a finding of violation of
section 8(b)(2) and an employer violation of section 8(a)(3). A majority of the Board
further found an 8(b)(3) violation, two members of the Board dissenting in agreement
with the trial examiner's refusal to find such a violation.
8 See text accompanying notes 90-92 infra.
9 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
10 Local 1367, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 148 N.L.R.B. No. 44 (1964); Independent
Metal Workers, Local 1 & 2, supra note 7; Miranda Fuel Co., supra note 6. See generally Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 Vu... L. REv. 151 (1957).
11 See note 5 supra.
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stantive question whether section 8(b)(1)(A) is so broad has been extensively treated elsewhere. 12 This comment will not treat that section
or 8(b)(3), but will concentrate on interpretation of sections 8(a)(3) and
8(b)(2). It should be noted, however, that unfair labor practices under
these various sections provide cumulative remedies; consequently, even
though a particular section might be inappropriate the same activity
could be reached through another. It should also be noted that many of
the policy arguments, discussed later, against the expansion of Board
power apply with equal force to unfair labor practices under any of
these sections.
In considering the scope of sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) this comment
will examine Supreme Court decisions which lead to the conclusion
that the scope of the sections depends critically upon the definition of
discrimination, since the other elements of a violation may be found
readily as derivatives of the discriminatory conduct. Despite its importance, the definition of discrimination is far from clear, even at this
late date, as illustrated by the recent NLRB decisions contrasted with
two recent cases in the Second Circuit, 13 the only two court cases this
writer has discovered which wrestle with the problem. This comment
will examine the respective positions of the Board and the Second
Circuit in the light of the Supreme Court cases, the legislative history,
and the implications of expanded Board power. It will be urged that a
restrictive reading be given to the statute by limiting the discrimination
covered by sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) to that based on union relationships or activities.
Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act provides that it
shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or
any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization . . .14
Section 8(b)(2) in turn makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization or its agents "to cause or attempt to cause an employer to
discriminate against an employee in violation of [Section 8(a)(3)]...."15
"Discrimination," as used in section 8(a)(3), might reasonably have
three meanings:
(1) any differentiation or distinction;
12

Ibid.

13 NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Local 294,

Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 317 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1963).
14 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1958).
'5 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1958).
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(2) any invidious distinction or differentiation based upon or
motivated by union relationships;
(3)differentiation or distinction without sufficient reason, a
meaning commonly conveyed by use of the adjectives "arbitrary"
or "invidious."
In addition to discrimination, the courts have often spoken of motive
or purpose as an element of violation of the statute; and section 8(a)(3)
indicates that the effect of encouragement or discouragement is another
requisite. It will be seen, however, that under the Supreme Court's
present construction the elements of purpose or motive and of effect
are not limiting factors, and consequently the scope of the statute depends entirely upon the definition of discrimination adopted.
The Supreme Court has frequently stated that the employer's intent
to encourage or discourage union membership is an element of an
8(a)(3) violation. 16 However, the requirement has been discarded as an
independent element because of the ease with which intent may be
inferred from the probable consequences of employer action. Radio
Officers Union v. NLRB' 7 is illustrative. The three cases in Radio
16 See, e.g., Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961); Radio
Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177
(1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
17 347 U.S. 17 (1954). Three cases alleging discrimination by the employer at the
request of a union were consolidated in Radio Officers. In NLRB v. Local 41, Int'l Bhd.
of Teamsters, the Board had issued an order against the union finding violation of
sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2). The Board found that the union, which periodically
furnished a seniority list to the company, dropped a driver to the bottom of the list
for not paying his dues on time. As a result the driver was denied driving assignments
he would otherwise have obtained and for which he would have been paid. The Eighth
Circuit denied the Board's petition to enforce its order, holding that there was abundant support for the conclusion that the employer was caused to discriminate against
the driver, but no evidence to support a conclusion that employees were or would be
encouraged or discouraged.
In Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, the Board had found violations of 8(b)(1)(A) and
8(b)(2) where the union had caused the employer to replace a radio operator, a union
member, because he had not been referred by the union but had been called directly
by the employer. The Board found that the contract did not provide for a hiring hall
arrangement, which would have legalized the actions in the case, but rather gave the
employer the right of free selection so long as the men called were union members in
good standing. The Board found that the union, by causing the operator's discharge
for not following the union's hiring hail rules, was not acting in conformity with a
contract and therefore restrained the employee in his right to refrain from observance
of the union's rules, and caused the company to discriminate against him by denying
him employment. 347 U.S. at 31. The Second Circuit granted enforcement of the
Board's order.
In NLRB v. Gaynor News Co. the Second Circuit granted enforcement of the Board's
order finding 8(a)(1), (2) and (3) violations where the employer gave retroactive wage
increases and vacation payments to employees who were union members and refused
such benefits to other employees. Though nonmembers had been denied admission to
the union because of a primogeniture requirement, the Board concluded that the
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Officers were the first cases involving the problem of encouragement of
union membership to reach the Court.18 In considering whether "proof
of motive" is required to find a violation, the Court said, "that Congress
intended the employer's purpose in discriminating to be controlling is
clear."' 9 It added, however, that
it is also clear that specific evidence of intent to encourage or
discourage is not an indispensable element of proof of violation
of § 8(a)(3).... [P]roof of certain types of discrimination satisfies
the intent requirement. This recognition that specific proof of
intent is unnecessary where employer conduct inherently encourages or discourages union membership is but an application
of the common law rule that a man is held to intend the forsee20
able consequences of his conduct.
On a later occasion the Court reiterated:
It is the "true purpose" or "real motive" in hiring or firing that
constitutes the test. .

.

. Some conduct may by its very nature

contain the implications of the required intent; the natural forseeable consequences of certain action may warrant the infer21
ence.
Motive and intent have distinct meanings in the law; motive being the
underlying cause or reason moving one to the action, intent the purpose
to use a particular means to effect the result. In discussing unfair labor
practices, the Supreme Court has blurred this distinction, thereby hindering careful analysis of the statute. For instance, in one recent case the
Court said,
Cases in this Court dealing with unfair labor practices have
recognized the relevance and importance of showing the employer's intent or motive to discriminate or to interfere with
union rights. But specific evidence of such subjective intent is
"not an indispensable element of proof of violation." 22
discrimination "had the natural and probable effect not only of encouraging non-union
employees to join the union, but also of encouraging union employees to retain their
union membership." 347 U.S. at 37. See generally The Supreme Court, 1953 Term,
68 HARv. L. Rv. 145 (1954); Recent Cases, 42 GEo. L.J. 542 (1954); 7 VAND. L. REv.
722 (1954).
18 Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 39 (1954). Since in two of the cases
the discrimination was directed at union members, the Court first dealt with the
meaning of "membership in any labor organization." The Court interpreted encouraging membership to include encouraging to "stay in good standing" in the union.
19 Id. at 44.
20 Id. at 45.
21 Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 675 (1961).
22 NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 227 (1963). See also cases cited note
16 supra.
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Thus, the Court has been careful not to disavow its early language about
an intent or motive requirement although the requirement is considerably diluted.
It is clear from the statute itself that the Court need not persist in
stating there is such a requirement. Clearly, purpose to encourage or discourage would be an element of a violation if section 8(a)(3) read "by
discrimination . . . in order to encourage or discourage." Justice Black,
dissenting in Radio Officers, called the "in order to" wording "the plain
and long accepted meaning of § 8(a)(3)" 23 and contended it should be
followed in that case. The original Senate bill in 1934 referred to "any
discriminatory practice ...

which encourages," 24 a reading which tends

toward absolute liability for discriminatory conduct having the requisite
effect regardless of a purpose of encouragement or discouragement. That
language was changed in committee to the language of the subsequent
act, language which may be read either way.2 5 It should also be noted that

the House Committee Report on the original Senate bill said "under
section 8(3) any discrimination is outlawed which tends to 'encourage or
discourage.' . . ."21 Purpose to encourage is not a requirement of the
language of 8(a)(3). And purpose to discriminate may be found so easily
from the discriminatory conduct itself as not to be an element.
If motive, broadly speaking, is that which incites or induces one to
action, it is also doubtful, in the light of what concerned Congress in
1947,27 that motive is necessary to a violation of section 8(a)(3). Certainly
in 1935 Congress was concerned about employer discrimination motivated
by his desire to encourage participation in certain independent unions
or to discourage any unionism.2 8 But in 1947, when 8(b)(2) was added to
the statute, Congress was concerned about union coercion, under union
security agreements or otherwise, compelling employers to discharge or
take other differential action against particular employees. The employer
in such cases acted because of the provisions of a contract, or because of
duress; perhaps out of fear of union reprisals or the economic costs of
23

Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 57-58 (1954).

NLRB, Lm sLATrVE HIsTORy OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT (1935) 3
(1949) [hereinafter cited as Laois. HSs. 1935]. (Emphasis added.)
25 Cf. Judge Friendly dissenting in NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir.
1963), "what Congress forbade was 'to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization' by 'discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment.'"
Id. at 181. The formulation which would result in absolute liability would say that
whenever encouragement or discouragement results from discrimination, there is a
violation.
26 2 LEGiS. Hsr. 1935 at 3071. (Emphasis added.)
27 See text accompanying notes 66-76 infra.
28 See text accompanying notes 58-65 infra.
24 1
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incurring a dispute with the union over the treatment of one worker.
Congress recognized that the employer was whipsawed. Motivated by
other considerations, such as preserving industrial peace, he was coerced
by the union into violation of the statute. Only in the most fictional sense
was there a motive "to encourage" unionism on the part of the employer.
In short, despite the confusion in language, motive is not required by
the statute. Purpose or intent, whether required by the statute or not, is
so easily inferred from the probable consequences of conduct as to be
irrelevant as an independent factor. The Court's discussion of intent or
purpose as a requirement may serve to preserve the appearance of not
departing from the requirement first read into the statute in 1937,29 but
now, as then, it is neither an obstacle to nor a requisite for finding a
violation.
The third factor which is spoken of as an element of a violation-this
one apparently required by the statute-is the effect of encouragement or
discouragement of union membership. 30 Although the impact of the
employer's differential treatment on employees is thus crucial to establishing a violation, a specific finding of the actual effect on employees is
also unnecessary. The three cases in Radio Officers reached the Supreme
Court after a conflict in the circuits over whether there must be specific
proof that the discrimination did or would encourage or discourage
membership in a labor organization. The Court concluded that actual
proof of employee response is not required where encouragement or discouragement can be reasonably inferred from the nature of the differential treatment.3 ' The Board is to apply its special competence and expertise in weighing the conduct and the circumstances and draw that
inference from the conduct. The inferences about effect are thus dependent upon the nature of the conduct. As will be demonstrated below,3 2
the necessary inferences may easily be drawn in any case.
The resulting interrelationship is readily apparent. Where discriminatory conduct is shown, the probable effects may be inferred, if necessary, from the nature of the conduct. The employer's purpose or intent
may also be presumed because of the probable consequences of his conduct. The inquiry into a possible violation is thus focussed on discrim29 NLR.B v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 47 (1937).
80 The term "membership," as it was defined in Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347
U.S. 17, 39-40 (1954), includes "membership in good standing." See also NLRB v. Erie
Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963). In discussing both 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) violations the
Court speaks there of the "interests of employees in concerted activity," id. at 229, and
also says "membership in any labor organization" in section 8(a)(3) includes "participation in concerted activities." Id. at 233.
81 347 U.S. at 48-52.
32 See text accompanying notes 39-41 infra.
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inatory conduct, with the other "elements" inferred or presumed therefrom.
The definition of discrimination is thus crucial-absent a showing of
specific intent 33 to encourage or discourage membership-to a determination of the scope of sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2). Since the Board possesses
wide latitude to draw inferences and, as will be shown below, the necessary reasonable inferences may easily be drawn when there is any differential treatment by an employer, the scope of sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2)
depends entirely on the definition of discrimination.
Two recent cases decided in the Second Circuit, illustrate the difficulties
and consequences of defining discrimination. In NLRB v. Miranda Fuel
Go. 34 the employer acquiesced in the union agent's demand that a truck
driver be dropped to the bottom of the seniority list. At first the basis for
the union's demand was that the driver had returned late from a summer
leave period, thus forfeiting his seniority rights under the contract.
When the union found that the tardiness was excused because of illness,
it changed its position and rested its demand on the driver's having left
three days earlier than the date specified in the contract (leaving on
Friday instead of waiting until Monday), though he had done so with the
employer's permission.
The NLRB's unfair labor practice order was based in part on a finding
of violation of sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) by the employer and union. 35
The Board held that 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) are violated when,
for arbitrary or irrelevant reasons or upon the basis of an unfair
classification, the union attempts to cause or does cause an employer to derogate the employment status of an employee.3 6
33 Even though it may not be possible to infer the requisite intent, a finding of
specific intent will impeach conduct which otherwise appears legitimate. NLRB v. Erie
Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 227-28 (1963).
34 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).

35 In Miranda, the Board also found violations of sections 8(a)(1) and 8(b)(1)(A).
The latter was based on the theory that the union's duty of fair representation created
a section 7 right of employees to be represented fairly. The union's arbitrary request
singling out one driver to be dropped in seniority for an insufficient reason was held
to violate its duty of fair representation; hence it constituted restraint and coercion of
the employee's section 7 right. This novel theory was rejected by Judge Medina in his
opinion in Miranda. Judge Lumbard thought it unnecessary to reach the question
since he felt there was insufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the union
took "hostile action for irrelevant, unfair, or invidious reasons" against the employer.
Judge Friendly's dissent dealt only with the 8(b)(2)-8(a)(3) question. Regarding the
duty of fair representation as an unfair labor practice, see generally Sovern, Racial
Discrimination and the National Labor Relations Act: The Brave New World of
Miranda, NEw YoRK UNxvERsrrY SIXTEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 3 (1963);
Comment, 112 U. PA. L. Rrv. 711 (1964); Note, 42 TEXAs L. REv. 917 (1964). Cox, The
Duty of FairRepresentation, 2 ViLL. L. Rlv. 151 (1957); See also Sovern, The National
Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 COLUm. L. REv. 563 (1962).
36 140 N.L.R.B. at 186.
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Judge Friendly, vigorously dissenting to the Second Circuit's denial of
enforcement of the Board's order,37 restated the Board theory as follows:
under the act discrimination need not be based on union membership or
activity-any arbitrary action which had the effect of encouraging union
membership was prohibited. The Board could reasonably have concluded
that the employer's arbitrary action, taken at the instigation of the union,
would tend to encourage membership by demonstrating the union's
power and leading employees to conclude they should get closer to or be
in good standing with the source of such power.
The Board's theory of encouragement by employer acquiescence in an
arbitrary union request, restated by Judge Friendly, is a reasonable one
and is suggested by language in Radio Officers. Although the discrimination in that case was based on union considerations, the Court stated,
"since encouragement of union membership is obviously a natural and
foreseeable consequence of any employer discrimination at the request of
a union, those employers must be presumed to have intended such en38
couragement."
As expressed in Radio Officers, "the policy of the Act is to insulate
employees' jobs from their organizational rights."3 9 Since the TaftHartley amendments, those rights include the right to refrain from
participation in union activities. Yet the employee's willingness to exercise his right to be a bad or indifferent union member may be curtailed
by a demonstration of the power of a union agent to get the employer
to take action affecting jobs. Although the union's request, and the
employer's discrimination, may not be related to organizational activities,
employees may cooperate more willingly in union matters in order to
curry favor with a source of power which may be exercised arbitrarily. If
that is indeed the effect, then the employer's differential treatment taken
at the union's request is discrimination which encourages union membership.
It should be noted that the Board's logic-that any discriminatory
action taken because of union instigation supports an inference of encouragement-can easily be extended so that any differential treatment
by an employer, although taken without any hint of union instigation,
supports an inference of encouragement. Assume the employer fires a
Negro or redhead simply because he does not like Negroes or redheads.
In the proper circumstances the Board could conclude that the employer's
action, which the union could not prevent, demonstrated the weakness of
the union, and thereby discouraged enthusiasm for union membership.
37 326 F.2d 172, 180 (2d Cir. 1963).
38 347 U.S. at 52. (Emphasis added.)

39 347 U.S. at 40.
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Or the Board could conclude that the employer's action stimulated participation in the union in an effort to make the union's economic position
powerful enough to prevent such action in the future.4 0 "The possibility
of drawing either of two inconsistent inferences from the evidence [does]
...41
not prevent the Board from drawing one of them.
Insofar as the Board's theory is concerned, it should be apparent that
the Board could reasonably draw an inference that encouragement was a
probable consequence of any differential treatment by the employer taken
at the union's request. And since the drawing of that inference is a
judgment that such an effect was a probable consequence of the employer's conduct, the employer's purpose-if a finding of it is necessarymay also be presumed.
The Board majority in Miranda considered the encouragement theory
to be the teaching of Radio Officers. The Board qualified its holding
slightly, however, in the light of NLRB v. Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters,42 viewing that case as holding that the employer action and union
request must be arbitrary or unjustified by a valid reason.4 3
Two members of the Second Circuit panel voted to deny enforcement
of the Board's order in Miranda. Judge Medina formulated the central
question as, "Whether any sort of discrimination against an employee,
affecting the terms and conditions of his employment, can constitute an
unfair labor practice under section 8, even if wholly unrelated to any
union considerations." 44 Judge Lumbard, in a separate opinion, concurred in the denial of enforcement. Both judges concluded that only
discrimination based upon union membership or other union connected
activities is discrimination violating 8(a)(3).
40 Cf. Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S.
17, 55 (1954): "[A]ny inference that may be drawn from the employer's alleged discriminatory acts is just one element of evidence which may or may not be sufficient,
without more, to show a violation. But that should not obscure the fact that this
inference may be bolstered or rebutted by other evidence which may be adduced, and
which the Board must take into consideration. The Board's task is to weigh everything before it, including those inferences which, with its specialized experience, it
believes can fairly be drawn. .... Since the issue which the Board thus has to decide
involves pre-eminently an exercise of judgment on matters peculiarly within its special
competence, little room will be left for judicial review." Id. at 56-57.
41 NLRB v. Nevada Consolidated Copper Corp., 316 U.S. 105, 106 (1942). Compare
Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 55 (1954) (Frankfurter, J. concurring);
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLR.B, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
42 365 U.S. 667 (1961). See text at notes 50-55, infra.
43 140 N.L.R.B. at 187-88: "an 8(a)(3) or 8(b)(2) violation does not necessarily flow
from conduct which has the foreseeable result of encouraging union membership, but
that given such 'foreseeable result' the finding of a violation may turn upon an evaluation of the disputed conduct 'in terms of legitimate employer or union purposes.'"
44 326 F.2d at 175.
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In reaching that conclusion Judge Medina relied heavily on the Second
Circuit's earlier decision in NLRB v. Local 294, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters.45
Judge Lumbard considered the case conclusive. The complaint in Local
294 had been issued only against the union. It charged that union officials
had attempted to influence the employer to refuse to request a particular
truck driver who had been receiving preferences in the assignment of
extra runs. The employer refused to agree until the union agent who
called the men for work refused to call the driver for jobs. It was uncontradicted that the union's agents had sought to exclude the driver
because he "was a troublemaker and no good." The Court denied enforcement of the Board's 8(b)(2) unfair labor practice order, holding that:
"a union does not violate section 8(b)(2) unless the discrimination which
the union seeks would constitute a violation of section 8(a)(3) if the
employer acted without union suggestion or compulsion." 46 The court
then concluded that there could not be a violation of 8(a)(8) unless the
discrimination by the employer is based on union membership or other
union connected activities.47
The court's attempt to limit the scope of 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) by its conclusion that 8(b)(2) is violated only if the conduct alleged would violate
section 8(a)(3) if the employer acted independently of union persuasion 48
needs examination. First, the court reached its conclusion by a non
sequitur.That the NLRB has refused to find an unfair labor practice in
some cases49 of employer differential treatment requested by a union, as
the court observed, does not mean that a violation is impossible in any
45 317 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1963).
46 Id. at 749.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.

49 The cases the Second Circuit cited, 317 F.2d at 748-49, were: Matter of Yonkers
Contracting Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 865 (1962), in which the union prevailed on the employer
to hire an employee who was a member of a crew about to be laid off instead of an
outside applicant. The Board held that it was clear that the union's function was to
attempt to obtain benefits for the employees it represented, and that here it was performing that function in inducing the employer to fill desirable new jobs from within
the working force rather than by hiring from outside; Matter of Wilputte Coke Oven
Div., Allied Chem. Corp., 135 N.L.R.B. 323 (1962), in which the union requested that
an employer who employed both local and out-of-town men lay off out-of-town men
first. The employer would not consent to that, but did agree to lay off in equal proportions. One of the out-of-town men who had been laid off charged that "local men"
were in fact synonomous with members of the union, and the union's request had
therefore been for unlawful preferential treatment. The Board found no basis for the
complaint and dismissed it; Matter of Plaza Builders, 134 N.L.R.B. 751 (1961), in which
the union prevailed upon the employer to lay off out-of-town men first on a construction project supported by local funds in an area of high unemployment. The examiner
and Board found that the requested treatment was not based on union considerations,
but was intended to further valid public policy objectives.
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case in which the employer's action would not violate 8(a)(3) if taken
independently. The cases the court cited seem to indicate only that the
differential treatment requested may be justified by a valid employer or
union purpose. Secondly, the court did not treat the possibility that
union instigation of the employer action is an important element; and
may be the very one upon which an inference of encouragement could
be based-so long as the differential treatment accorded by the employer
is considered "discrimination." But that merely highlights the difficulty
with the court's conclusion that the employer's action should be such
as would constitute an 8(a)(3) violation if taken independently. That
requirement is not an exacting one aside from a more precise definition
of what the term "discrimination" encompasses.
In addition to rejecting the Board's encouragement theory in Teamsters Local 294 because it stemmed from an "overly broad" reading of
Radio Officers, the Second Circuit said the theory "has been completely
rejected" by Teamsters Local 357.50
The court's reliance, in Teamsters Local 294 and in Miranda, on
Teamsters Local 35751 seems misplaced, as Judge Friendly argued. In
Local 357 the employer discharged a union member at the request of the
union in order to comply with a hiring hall contract. The contract provided for referral based on seniority, but on a non-discriminatory basis
with respect to union membership. The discharged employee had not
been hired through the hall as the contract required. Because the hiring
hall contract did not comply on its face with the Board's "Mountain
Pacific standards, '52 the Board found a per se violation of 8(b)(2).
The Supreme Court held that discrimination could not be inferred
from a contract which on its face provided that employees were to be
treated without discrimination. The Court conceded that the existence
of the hiring hall might encourage union membership 53 but observed that
50 317 F.2d at 750.

51 Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
52 See Mountain Pacific, Chapter of the Associated General Contractors, Inc., 119
N.L.R.B. 883 (1957). In its opinion in that case the Board said it would find hiring hall
agreements to be non-discriminatory on their faces only if the agreements explicitly
provided that: "(I) Selection of applicants for referral to jobs shall be on a non-discriminatory basis and shall not be based on, or in any way affected by, union membership, by-laws, rules, regulations, constitutional provisions, or any other aspect or
obligation of union membership, policies, or requirements. (2) The employer retains
the right to reject any job applicant referred by the union. (3) The parties to the
agreement post in places where notices to employees and applicants for employment
are customarily posted, all provisions relating to the functioning of the hiring arrangement, including the safeguards that we deem essential to the legality of an exclusive
hiring agreement." Id. at 897.
53 Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas said, "It may be that the very existence
of the hiring hall encourages union membership. We may assume that it does. The
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Congress had explicitly indicated that hiring halls were useful and that
hiring hall contracts serve legitimate business purposes. 54 Since the employer had done nothing except comply with the contract, his action was
not "the kind of discrimination to which the act was addressed."'55 The
case rejected a finding of discrimination predicated on a non-discriminatory hiring hall which served a legitimate purpose. Contrary to the
conclusion of the Second Circuit, the case did not indicate that discrimination was prohibited only if it was based upon union membership
or activity.
In short, the foregoing discussion illustrates that, apart from discrimination, the requisite elements of 8(a)(3) or 8(b)(2) violations may be
inferred by the Board from any arbitrary conduct. Hence, the scope of
Board power depends on the content given the term "discrimination."
The issues involved may be illuminated by considering the three possible meanings of the term, advanced earlier, in the light of their consequences and the purposes and history of the statute. Certainly the
"neutral" definition of any differential treatment or distinction is too
broad. It would encompass any differences in treatment in the employment relation. The employer would be unable to take reasonable action
necessary to conduct his business. The Board and the courts have implicitly avoided such a definition by tolerating, as a reasonable exercise of
business judgment, some differential treatment, even when alleged to be
based on union considerations. 56
The second meaning of discrimination-invidious distinction or differentiation based on union relationships-is supported by the weight of
very existence of the union has the same influence. When a union engages in collective
bargaining and obtains increased wages and improved working conditions, its prestige
doubtless rises and, one may assume, more workers are drawn to it. When a union
negotiates collective bargaining agreements that include arbitration clauses and supervises the functioning of those provisions so as to get equitable adjustments of grievances, union membership may also be encouraged. The truth is that the union is a
service agency that probably encourages membership whenever it does its job well.
But, as we said in Radio Officers v. Labor Board. ... the only encouragement or discouragement of union membership banned by the Act is that which is 'accomplished
by discrimination.'" 365 U.S. at 675-76.
54 The Court said, "Congress has not outlawed the hiring hall ....
Senator Taft
made clear his views that hiring halls are useful, that they are not illegal per se, that
unions should be able to operate them so long as they are not used to create a closed
shop: 'In order to make dear the real intention of Congress, it should be dearly stated
that the hiring hall is not necessarily illegal. The employer should be able to make a
contract with the union as an employment agency. The union frequently is the best
employment agency. The employer should be able to give notice of vacancies, and in
the normal course of events to accept men sent to him by the hiring hall.
365
U.S. at 673-74.
55

Id. at 675.

56 See note 88, infra and cases supra note 49.
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authority in the cases 57 and, the legislative history indicates, is dearly
what was meant by the term in the statute.
The legislative history of the precursor of section 8(a)(3), section 8(3)
of the Wagner Act, indicates that the lawmakers were primarily concerned with employer reprisals against employees because of the employees' union activity or membership. The bill, in its journey through
the Congress, went from the more particular to the more general. As
originally introduced in 1934, it was made an unfair labor practice for
an employer
to engage in any discriminatory practice as to wage or hour
differentials, advancement, demotion, hire, tenure of employment, reinstatement, or any other condition of employment,
which encourages membership or nonmembership in any labor
organization ....58

After amendment in committee, the bill as reported to the Senate made
it an unfair labor practice
for an employer, by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure
of employment or any term or condition of employment, or by
contract or agreement, to encourage or discourage membership
in any labor organization .... 59

The Senate Report on the original bill explained that an employer did
not have to hire an incompetent and was free to discharge an employee
who lacked skill or ability, but
the employer ought not to be free to discharge an employee
merely because he joins an organization or to refuse to hire him
merely because of his membership in an organization. Nor
should an employer be free to pay a man a higher or lower wage
solely because of his membership or nonmembership in a labor
organization. 60
The bill failed to pass either house. When reintroduced in 1935, the
relevant portions had been altered to their present reading. 6' Reports in
both houses explained that section 8(3) rounded out the provisions of
section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act 62 which prohibited
57 See text accompanying notes 77-9 infra.

HIsr. 1985 at 3.
at 1087.
60 Id. at 1105.
61 Id. at 1299-1800; 2 LEGIs. HInT. 1935 at 2449.
62 48 Stat. 195 (1933) Section 7(a): "Every code of fair competition, agreement, and
license approved, prescribed, or issued under this title shall contain the following
conditions: (1) That employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively
58 1 LEGis.
59 Id.
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yellow dog contracts and interference, restraint, or coercion of employees
in their organizational rights.63
There was little debate on the section. Senator Wagner, in introducing
the bill and discussing it on the floor, seemed implicitly to be referring
to discrimination against an employee because he was a union member.64
Senator Walsh emphasized that an employer retained the power to make
necessary employment decisions, but that he could not dismiss employees
"when they are objectionable on no other ground than that they belong
to or have organized a labor union." 65
Thus, the legislative history of the 1935 Act indicates an intention to
prevent employer reprisals or ill treatment of employees because of
membership or participation in union activities. While "discrimination"
is not defined, the legislators had in mind conduct such as discharges,
refusals to hire or to promote, or the payment of lower wages because of
the employee's union activity.
The history of the Taft-Hartley amendments, and of section 8(b)(2) in
particular, throws additional light on what the legislators conceived to
be "discrimination." In 1947, Congress was concerned about pressure by
unions on employers to discharge or refuse to hire employees under union
security arrangements when those employees had been refused admission
to or had been ousted from the union. The Senate committee report on
the bill stated that section 8(b)(2) 66 was "designed to protect individual
employees from discrimination in employment induced by a labor organization which has a union-shop contract with an employer .... ,67
through representatives of their own choosing, and shall be free from interference,

restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such
representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other -mutual aid or protection; (2) that no employee and no
one seeking employment shall be required as a condition of employment to join any
company union or to refrain from joining, organizing, or assisting a labor organization
of his own choosing ....
" 1 LEGIs. HisT. 1935 at 198-99.
63 2 LEGiS. HisT. 1935 at 2310, 2927, 2973, 3068.
64 Id. at 2335.
65 Id. at 2370.
66 The section, in S. 1126 as reported, provided: "It shall be an unfair labor practice
for a labor organization or its agents-. . . (2) to persuade or attempt to persuade an
employer to discriminate against an employee with respect to whom membership in
such organization has been denied or terminated on some ground other than his
failure to tender the dues and initiation fee uniformly required as a condition of
acquiring or retaining membership or because he engaged in activity designed to
secure a determination pursuant to section 9(c)(1)(A) at a time when a question concerning representation may appropriately be raised." I N.L.R.B. LEGISLATIVE HnsToRY or
THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947 112 (1948) [hereinafter cited as LEGIs.
Hnr. 1947].
67 Id. at 427.
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According to the report, unions were free to observe whatever membership provisions they desired but only two reasons were specified for
"effecting the discharge of, or other job discrimination against, an
employee."08
Discrimination is permitted only if [the employee] has failed
to tender dues and initiation fees or has engaged in 'dual union'
activity or activity designed to oust the incumbent union as
exclusive representative, at an inappropriate time. 69
The language "discrimination is permitted" implies that discrimination
is discharge or other prejudicial treatment of an employee because of
the quality or absence of his union membership.
As they passed each house and went to conference, the bills differed
somewhat from each other 70 and, significantly, from the final product.
The reasons for the ultimate changes in conference are not revealed. The
House Conference Report stated that the Senate amendments providing
for union unfair labor practices had been broader in scope than the
corresponding provisions of the House bill, and then explained the
conference agreement in the following significant language:
(1) Section 8(b)(2) is expanded so as to prohibit all attempts
by a labor organization... to cause an employer to discriminate
against an employee in violation of section 8(a)(3). The latter
section, as heretofore explained, prohibits an employer from
discriminating against an employee by reason of his membership
or nonmembership in a labor organization, except to the extent
that he obligates himself to do so under the terms of a permitted
71
union shop or maintenance of membership contract.
68 Ibid.

69 Ibid. (Emphasis added.) The minority report objected strongly to sections 8(a)(3)
and 8(b)(2) and stated, "If these provisions are merely designed to outlaw the closedshop closed-union arrangement and to permit union security agreements not based on
the dosed union practice, they have gone far beyond what is needed to achieve that
purpose." Id. at 472. The dear implication is that the legislative purpose, at least as
seen through the eyes of the minority, was to deal with abuses of union security
arrangements.
70 H.R. 3020, as it passed the House, provided in section 8(c)(7) that it was an unfair
labor practice for a labor organization "to take any action or make any arrangements
that would have the effect of requiring an employer to deny employment to, or
terminate the employment of, any individual (A) to whom membership in such
organization was not available on the same terms and conditions as those applicable
to other members, or (B) to whom membership in such organization was denied on
some ground other than failure to tender the initiation fees and dues uniformly
required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership." 1 L is. Hrr.1947 at
181-82. H.R. 3020, as it passed the Senate, had been amended by Senate substitute, and
read as in note 66, supra. Id. at 240.
71 Id. at 548. (Emphasis added.)
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The excerpt is significant for it reflects preoccupation with discrimination based on membership or nonmembership in a labor organization.
This is confirmed by language in the debates before passage of the bills.
Senator Taft, among others, spoke of an employer being caused to exdude a man from work because he had been fired from the union.72
Taft's use of "discrimination" as found in 8(a)(3) dearly referred to
discharge for nonmembership.73
In short, the history of the 1947 Act indicates a concern primarily with
union coercion to get an employer to discharge or accord less favorable
treatment to employees because of the loss of or failure to obtain membership.
There is no indication that "discrimination" was thought to include
racial discrimination. Allusions to discrimination on racial grounds were
almost nonexistent. Senator Murray, a vigorous opponent of the TaftHartley bills, did refer to 8(a)(3) as extending federal controls over employer and union discrimination based on race; 74 and Representative
Smith of Virginia, a proponent of the bill, defended himself against the
charge in an "anonymous circular" that the bill "would put into effect
the so called FEPC bill" by denying that it compelled employers or
unions to change any of their practices regarding racial distinctions in
hiring or membership.75 The fact that the same Congress that passed the
Taft-Hartley Act refused to pass several "FEPC" bills which sought to
76
prohibit discrimination in employment on racial and other grounds
lends some support to this view.
Although the cases have not carefully articulated the content of the
term, they generally reinforce the implication of the legislative history
72 2 LEcIs. HIsr. 1947 at 1010, 1012, 1420, 1497, 1508. See also remarks of Sen.
Ellender, id. at 1068; and discussion of Sens. Taft, Pepper, and others, id. at 1094-98.
73 See id. at 1010. In a somewhat enigmatic statement referring to now section
8(b)(2) Rep. Hartley had referred to the bill as conferring a "bill of rights" upon the
worker including the right "to require the union that is his bargaining agent to
represent him without discriminating against him in any way or for any reason, even
if he is not a member of the union." 1 LEGIS. HIsT. 1947 at 616.
74 2 IEGIs. HisT. 1947 at 1569: "But this provision takes an enormous forward step
in the direction of regulating the employment practices of industry and the exclusion
practices of unions, without any adequate study having been given the matter. It is
unhappily true that in certain sections of our country, race prejudices are strong and
deep. With time and education they will, I am sure, disappear; and there are encouraging signs looking in that direction. But despite my conviction that the sooner we can
eliminate race and religious prejudices the better, I hesitate to approve so vital a step
at this time as making the Federal Government the overseer of employer and union
practices in all the states."
75 1 LEGis. HIST. 1947 at 906.
76 93 CONG. REc. 46, 47, 262, 329, 2688, 2788, 2932, 2999, 3375, 3674, 4343, 4552, 10100
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that discrimination means invidious differential treatment based on or
motivated by union relationships. The relevant early Supreme Court
cases sustained Board findings of violations involving apparent employer
reprisals against employees because of their union activities or affiliation.
Included were cases in which the employer discharged workers who
became union members or were active in union affairs,77 refused initial
hiring of men involved in union activities,1 8 or refused to rehire certain
of the most active union members when employees offered to return to
work following a strike. 79 In each case the treatment was found by the
Board to be the consequence of union activity by the victim employee.
From these cases, implicitly involving violations of discouragement, one
must conclude that "discrimination" refers to differential treatment
based on union relationships.8 0
"Discrimination" may reasonably be argued to have the third meaning
set forth above-differentiation or distinction taken without sufficient
reason. Support for giving section 8(a)(3) this meaning may be found by
analogy to other cases involving allegations of discriminatory treatment
in violation of the national labor policy, particularly allegations of
violation by a union of its duty of fair representation. Under its duty of
fair representation, the union undertakes what may be described as a
fiduciary responsibility to represent the interests of the members of the
bargaining unit fairly. This duty does not prevent all differences in treatment; but in each case whether the different treatment violates the
union's duty to minorities in the unit and to its members depends upon
the nature of the interest harmed and the justification for such harm.8 1
Differential treatment based on race would always be vulnerable,8 2 except
perhaps for a beneficial inequality. In some circumstances a legitimate
77 NLRB v. Waterman S.S. Co., 309 U.S. 206 (1940); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301
U.S. 103 (1937); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). See also
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
78 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
79 NLRB v. Mackay Radio &Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
80 See International Assoc. of Machinists, Lodge No. 35 v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72, 81
(1940) where the Court explicitly refers to "discrimination upon the basis of union
membership" constituting a violation of 8(3).
81 See Note, Duty of Union to Minority Groups in the Bargaining Unit, 65 HARv. L.
REv. 490 (1952). Regarding the duty of fair representation, see generally Cox, The Duty
of Fair Reperesentation, 2 VILL. L. REv. 151 (1957); Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination,62 COLUm. L. Rv. 563 (1962). In regard to the
union's duty to minority groups in bargaining and in grievance prosecution, see generally Wellington, Union Democracy and FairRepresentation:FederalResponsibility in a
Federal System, 67 YALx L.J. 1327 (1958); Note, 65 HARV. L. REv. 490 (1952).
82 Cf. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952); Tunstall v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944); Steele v. Louiseville & N.
R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
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business or union purpose, or a purpose which vindicates an important
public policy objective, will justify differential treatment.8 3
The concept of "discrimination" as any differential treatment taken
without sufficient justification appears, at first, to be the most reasonable,
for it allows a weighing of interests, balancing the impact on employees'
organizational rights of different treatment-even if based partly on
union considerations-against the business purpose or other policy objective of the employer in his action.8 4 Such a balancing seems implicitly to
have been decisive in the Mackay case in which the employer's legitimate
business purpose of continuing operations during an economic strike was
found to warrant hiring replacements.8 5 Even some racial distinctions
might be justified. It might be proper for an employer to add Negro
workers who are not union members to his work force, although white
union members are available to work,8 6 in order to promote the public
policy of increasing employment opportunities for Negroes.
83 Thus a union may demand-and presumably an employer may sign-a contract
giving top seniority to employees who are union officials because stability, continuity,
and responsibility in bargaining benefit the business operations and neither be in
violation of the union's duty of fair representation nor cause the employer to be guilty
of "discrimination." Aeronautical Industrial District Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337 U.S.
521 (1949), (suit for back pay by employee who was laid off temporarily, although union
chairmen who had less time with the company were retained). Justice Frankfurter
commented upon the key role of union chairmen in collective bargaining and the
importance of their continuity in office and said, "A provision for the retention of
union chairmen beyond the routine requirements of seniority is not at all uncommon
and surely ought not to be deemed arbitrary or discriminatory." Id. at 528. The Court
clearly implied that it is not discriminatory for the employer to agree to such a
seniority provision. See also Pacific Gamble Robinson Co. v. NLRB, 186 F.2d 106
(6th Cir. 1960), a §§ 8(a)(1) and (5) case, in which the employer's offer of slightly
higher wage rates to workers replacing strikers was found to be justified by his right
to try to keep his business going. Compare Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17
(1954), in which the Gaynor News Company's contention that its business judgment
justified it giving higher raises to union members than to non-union members was
held not to be a legitimate justification. Cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330
(1953) (suit to invalidate seniority clause in collective bargaining agreement), which
indicates the employer and the union may sign an agreement giving a veterans seniority
credit to new employees for active duty time served before employment in excess of
the requirements of the Selective Service Act, and not be guilty of discrimination
because their action is in harmony with the purposes of that Act.
84 Compare NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 228-29 (1963).
85 NLRB v. Mackay Radio &Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). The Board entered
unfair labor practice orders under both sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3). The Court held
that it was not an unfair labor practice "to replace the striking employees with others
in an effort to carry on the business." Id. at 345. The Court discussed the way the
employer might have refused reinstatement on valid grounds and thus avoid having
his differential treatment termed "discrimination." Id. at 346-47. The Court in Mackay
affirmed the Board's order finding that the employer's refusal to rehire five strikers
who had been very active in union affairs was a violation of section 8(a)(3). Id. at 347.
86 Cf. the difficulty between Plumbers Local Union 2 and Astrove Plumbing &
Heating Corp., involving the New York City Public Works Department and the City
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This concept of discrimination seems to allow the most flexible implementation of the labor statute to each case without the mechanical
expansiveness of the first meaning of discrimination-any differentiation
or distinction-or the narrowness of the second-any differentiation
based on union relationships. Arbitrary or invidious distinctions would
be proscribed, and those distinctions by an employer which are justified
by a valid business8 7 or other purpose as well as those requests by a union
which do not violate its duties to the members of the bargaining unit
would be tolerated. The determination that the differential treatment
involved in a particular case is arbitrary or invidious and therefore "discrimination" violating the statute would be made by the Board, weighing
all the factors involved in the case.
Although such a balancing of interests seems reasonable, the legislative
history indicates the less expansive concept of discrimination-those
invidious distinctions made because of union relationships-was intended. Other bases for invidious distinctions, even racial ones, were not
intended or thought to be encompassed by the act.88 Additional considerations, equally applicable to sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(3), militate
against creating a broad NLRB administrative remedy. An already
Commission on Human Rights, in late April and May, 1964. See N.Y. Times, May 2,
1964, p. 1, col. 3 (city ed.).
87 An employer charged with a violation of section 8(a)(3), on the basis of his
acquiescence to a union request, may seek to justify his conduct on the grounds that
it was motivated b&a desire to preserve industrial peace and thus that it was justified
by a legitimate business purpose. Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in Teamsters Local
357, 365 U.S. 667, 677 (1961), addressed himself to this contention and concluded that,
"The employer's non-discriminatory reason for encouraging union membership-to
avoid the economic pressure the union could impose upon him-was surely no longer
intended to be a justification for such employer action after the passage of § 8(b)(2), a
statutory provision the very working of which presupposes that union coercion can
cause a violation of § 8(a)(3)." Id. at 683.
88 See text accompanying notes 74-76 supra. It should be noted, however, that the
oft-cited language in the debates over the Taft-Hartley Act to the effect that unions
could continue to discriminate in membership so long as the lack of membership was
not used as a reason for preventing hiring by the employer, see, e.g., Sen. Rep. No. 105
on S. 1126, 1 LEGIs. HisT. 1947 at 427; remarks of Sen. Taft, 2 LEGIs. HisT. 1947 at 1010,
may rely on a distinction which is non-existent in industries which have a closed shop
tradition or a tradition of refusal to work with non-union members, or in industries
allowing unions to run hiring halls the services of which non-union members in
practice fear to use, see Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667,
685-94 (1961) (Clark, J. dissenting). In these industries, such as the building trades,
racial discrimination in apprenticeship programs and in membership has the practical
result of exclusion from employment. For one solution to the problem of racial discrimination in apprenticeship programs in the building trades, see Todd v. Joint
Apprenticeship Comm., 55 L.R.R.M. 2171 (N.D. Ill. 1963) which found a constitutional
basis to order the end of racial discrimination in the amount of federal and local
government support of the apprentice school. But see Gaynor v. Rockefeller, 56
L.R.R.M. 2210 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964).
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heavily burdened Labor Board may be swamped by complaints of abuse
and ill-treatment by employees. Not only may there be numerous cases
which, like Miranda, do not involve racial discrimination but allege
other kinds of injustice and ill-treatment at the hands of the union or
employer, but even more burdensome may be the number of cases which
allege differential treatment on racial grounds. Concededly, the possibility of many meritorious claims of injustices, particularly because of race,
suggests the need to prevent such abuses. But it does not mean the unfair
labor practice machinery is historically or practically the appropriate
mechanism.
Furthermore, charging the Board with weighing' all the interests involved gives the Board responsibility over some matters not within its
special competence. The weighing of contrary public policies,8 9 particularly those outside the policy which fostered the NLRB, is not a matter
of Board expertise. That function is for the courts.
A serious question of possible preemption of state remedies is also
raised by the Board's extension of its jurisdiction to complaints of discrimination on other than union grounds. Any allegation of discriminatory or unjust treatment may be arguably an unfair labor practice.
Federal and state courts are preempted from hearing such cases because
the Board has primary jurisdiction over them.90 In racial cases, state fair
employment practices laws and administrative remedies created under
such state commissions may also be preempted. The language of the
state statutes directly covers the type of conduct which might be alleged
as 8(a)(3) or 8(b)(2) violations. 91 Conflict in remedies or in interpretation
89 As in the selective service case discussed supra. See text accompanying note 83
supra.
90 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). "When an activity
is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts
must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the
danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted." Id. at 245. But cf.,
Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714 (1963),
holding that Colorado is not prevented from applying its Anti-Discrimination Act to
an interstate air carrier by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 or the Railway Labor Act.
See generally State-FederalClash Possible over FEP-Union Contracts,56 LAB. REL. RE.x.
394 (1964).
91 See, e.g., N.Y. ExEc. LAw 296 which provides:
1. It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice:
(a) For an employer, because of the age, race, creed, color or national
origin of any individual, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to
discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against
such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges
of employment.
(b) For a labor organization, because of the age, race, creed, color or
national origin of any individual, to exclude or to expel from its
membership such individual or to discriminate in any way against
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of national labor policy or other public policies is possible. And this
possibility has been a sufficient rationale for preemption of state jurisdiction over matters subject to NLRB administrative remedies. 92 It would
be anomalous in this instance to select a definition resulting in preemption, since it would mean giving the Board power to consider policy
matters beyond its expertise while denying that power to agencies specifically entrusted with making such determinations.
With regard to racial discrimination, it is also interesting to note that
approval of the use of the unfair labor practice machinery for charges
of racial discrimination would give much of what was withheld, with
regard to enforcement, in the journey through the legislative process 93
of Title VII (the Equal Employment Opportunity Law) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. 94 The language of section 703(a) and (c), 9 5 creating

employer and union "unlawful employment practices," corresponds
closely to state fair employment practices statutes9 6 and explicitly covers
the type of discrimination sought to be included in 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2).
The furnishing of public counsel to prosecute complaints is a great
advantage of the NLRB remedy. In the Civil Rights bill as it passed the
House of Representatives, an individual could file a charge of an unlawful employment practice and, after investigation and effort by the Commission to gain voluntary compliance, could also have the Commission
file a civil action for enforcement of the act. However, before Senate
any of its members or against any employer or any individual employed
by an employer.
CAL. LABOR CODE § 1420 specifies unlawful employment practices in virtually identical
wording.
92 See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 286 (1959). But ef.
Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., supra note 90.
See generally Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and State jurisdiction over Labor
Relations, 59 COLUmn. L. Rxv. 6, 269 (1959).
93 For a summary of the legislative action, see 56 LAB. REL. REP. 281 (1964).
94 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
95 Section 703(a), 78 Stat. 255 (1964), of the Civil Rights Act provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Section 703(c), 78 Stat. 255 (1964), says:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization . .
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual in violation of this section.
96 See note 91, supra.
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acceptance, the so-called "Dirksen amendments" altered the bill to provide
that if the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC) fails
to secure compliance within a specified time the aggrieved individual is
notified and must himself file a civil action within thirty days.9 7 Although
the court may appoint an attorney and authorize the initiation of the
action without payment of costs, fees or security-or may permit the
Attorney General to intervene if he certifies that the case is of public
importance-it is evident that the administrative remedy under the
Labor Act, with the NLR.B General Counsel prosecuting the action if
court enforcement is necessary, is easier for the grievant. This is one
reason the General Counsel for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People hailed the Labor Board's decision in the Independent Metal Workers case, despite the signing into law the same day
of the Civil Rights Act. 98
The expression of national policy in the Civil Rights Act raises some
questions about the unfair labor practice remedy in racial cases. It may
be that the Senate amendment strongly implies that an administrative
agency was not to have power to initiate suits for enforcement in racial
cases. On the other hand, the amendment-part of an omnibus package
of amendments thought to be necessary for passage of the total billneed not have any specific significance; or may indicate merely that the
Senate did not want to give such powers to that particular agency, one
which was new and untried and-as a "federal FEPC"-historically controversial. But the question asked by the dissenters in Independent Metal
Workers is still relevant: "If a separate agency is created to handle the
task of eliminating employment discrimination by unions and employers
based on race, should the Board have a duty in this field?" 99
It may also be significant that the EEOC is given authority to relinquish part or all of its enforcement function by entering into a cooperative agreement with a state or local agency when an unlawful employment
97 Another significant enforcement provision of the act is that in § 707 which
authorizes the Attorney General to file an action requesting injunctions or other relief
when he "has reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of persons is
engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the
rights secured by this title, and that the pattern or practice is of such nature and is
intended to deny the full exercise to the rights herein described ...."
98 Another factor is that the Civil Rights Act is phased into effect over a period of
years, according to the size of the businesses affected. See § 701(b). Robert L. Carter, a
general counsel of the NAACP, hailed the Independent Metal, Workers decision by the
Board as a breakthrough of "almost revolutionary proportions" so far as labor law is
concerned. He added that he would prefer to process complaints through the NLRB
rather than through the fair employment practices provisions of the Civil Rights Act
since the NLRB procedures would be easier, less costly to the individual, and more
widely applicable. N.Y. Times, July 3, 1964, p. 1, col. 6.
99 147 N.L.R.B. No. 166, at 21 (1964).
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practice occurs in a state or city which has its own fair employment
practices law. 100 Even if there is no such cooperative agreement, the state
and local authorities are given time to deal with the situation first.' 0 '
These provisions for cooperation with and deference to state FEPCs
indicate an expression of policy sharply contrasting with the preemption
of such state agencies which is possible if the NLRB's unfair labor practice machinery is involved.
CONCLUSION

"Discrimination," as the term is used in section 8(a)(3) and by reference
in 8(b)(2) should be limited to that differential treatment which is based
on or related to "union membership, loyalty, the acknowledgement of
union authority or the performance of union obligations"'102 by the employee involved. Since the maximum obligation of "membership" the
union can impose under the act-by union security agreement with the
employer-is the payment of dues and a reasonable initiation fee,103 the
attempt to enforce other obligations or deference to the union by getting
the employer to afford differential treatment to any employee is forbidden. 0 4 As before, the term should be conceived of as modified by
"arbitrary" or "invidious." Thus a business purpose or union objective
valid under the national labor policy may justify even differential treatment based on union relationships. 105 Such a definition of discrimination
best accords with the Congressional intent. Such a limited definition also
will prevent an undue expansion of Labor Board jurisdiction; an expansion undesirable because the burden may divert the Board's attention
from matters indisputably committed to its care to questions beyond its
special area of competence. A limited definition also will prevent preemption of tribunals whose function is to consider charges of racial
discrimination. Elimination of racial discrimination and other arbitrary
treatment is a worthy objective, but expansion of the unfair labor practices of sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) is an inappropriate method.
100 Civil Rights Act § 709(b).
101 Civil Rights Act § 706(b)(c).
102 Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 187 (1962) (McCulloch and Fanning,
dissenting); Independent Metal Workers Union, Local 1 & 2, 147 N.L.R.B. No. 166 at
21 (McCulloch and Fanning, dissenting).
103 NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963).
104 See e.g., Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
105 See note 83, supra.

